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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the interaction between hedging, 
financing, and investment decisions. This work is relevant in that theoretical predictions are not 
necessarily identical to those in the case where only two decisions are being made. We argue that the way 
in which hedging affects the firms’ financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth 
opportunities. We empirically find that high-growth firms increase their investment, but not their leverage, 
by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase 
their leverage. 
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I. Introduction 
According to the theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), in a perfect capital 
market neither hedging nor financing decisions add value to shareholders since companies can 
always obtain external funds at the same costs as internal funds to finance their investment 
opportunities. Thus, in order for investors to care about these decisions by corporations, some 
market imperfections must exist.  
Most existing theories discuss either investment and financing, investment and hedging 
or financing and hedging. They show  that various imperfections affect hedging and financing, 
hedging and investment, or investment and financing decisions. Underinvestment theories raised 
by Bessembinder (1991) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that firms with greater 
growth opportunities should hedge more because of capital market imperfections. Tax shields 
associated with debt financing lead Stulz (1996), Ross (1996), and Leland (1998) to posit that 
hedging causes an increase in firm value by enabling firms to increase leverage.  The debt 
capacity argument thus predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage. When 
looking at financing and investment, Myers (1977) demonstrates that firms with good investment 
opportunities should carry less debt since a high level of debt induces managers to forgo positive 
NPV projects.  
However, the theoretical relationship  between hedging, financing, and investment 
decisions can be different than when we consider just two of three decisions in isolation. For 
example, by considering the relation among hedging, leverage, and investment, Ross (1996) 
argues that hedging to increase leverage may not mitigate the underinvestment problem, since if 
firms increase debt capacity after hedging then this higher leverage increases the agency cost of 
debt that in turn leads to the incentive for underinvestment. Ross’ argument implies that firms   2 
with high growth opportunities are more likely to hedge to mitigate the underinvestment problem 
and are less likely to increase debt capacity. For firms with few growth opportunities, Stulz 
(1996) suggests that a manager with interests that are aligned with those of shareholders would 
be more likely to hedge to increase leverage in order to maximize shareholder wealth.  
Given these often conflicting theories, the purpose of this paper is to empirically 
investigate the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions for firms with 
different growth opportunities. We argue that a three equation system is more consistent with the 
idea that all three decisions are made at the same time. Therefore, we investigate these decisions 
within a simultaneous framework  in order to avoid the standard problem of endogeneity. In 
particular, we use derivative usage to measure the  extent of risk management. While we 
recognize that derivatives can be used for speculation purposes, due to the data constraints we 
assume that derivatives are used as hedging instruments.  
By conducting cross-sectional regressions as well as tests for new users of derivatives, we 
find empirical evidence to support Ross’ hypothesis (1996) that firms with high investment 
opportunities are more likely to mitigate the underinvestment problem by hedging. Moreover, we 
do not find that those firms increase their leverage by hedging. However, we find that, consistent 
with Stulz (1996), firms with poor investment opportunities increase their leverage by hedging.   
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the current literature 
and develops the hypotheses. Section III provides the methodology. Section IV describes our 
data and Section V provides empirical results. We conclude in Section VI. 
 
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
II.1 Literature Review    3 
Most of hedging and financing theories attempt to explain why investors concern 
themselves with these decisions by introducing some market imperfection(s) into the classic 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm. The following summarizes some of the imperfections 
that induce firms to make investment, financial or risk management decisions that influence firm 
value.  
II.1.1 Hedging and Financing 
The likelihood of incurring bankruptcy costs is a disadvantage to the use of debt 
financing. In the case of  financial distress, the value of the firm is reduced because payments 
must be made to third parties other than bond- or shareholders. Mayers and Smith (1982) and 
Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that if financial distress is costly, hedging lowers the 
probability of encountering financial distress b y reducing cash flow variability and, thus, 
increases firm value. By using leverage to proxy for the possibility of incurring financial distress, 
Dolde (1995), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Haushalter (2000), Gay and Nam (1998), and 
Graham and Roders (2002) find a positive relation between hedging and leverage. However, 
using the same proxy but a different sample and control variables, Nance, Smith, and Smithson 
(1993), Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find no support for 
this hypothesis. 
  Stulz (1996), Ross (1996) and Leland (1998) suggest that tax shields associated with debt 
financing provide an incentive for risk management. They argue that by reducing risk, hedging 
enables the firm to increase debt capacity and to reduce tax liabilities due to increases in leverage. 
Graham and Rogers (2002) look at derivatives and leverage decisions and find that firms with 
higher leverage are more likely to hedge and that hedging leads to higher leverage. However,   4 
using a different sample and control variables, Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find no 
support for this hypothesis.  
II.1.2 Hedging and Investment   
The underinvestment problem raised by Myers (1977) provides an incentive for hedging. 
Myers (1977) suggests that a firm’s investment opportunities are options and since shareholders 
are the residual claimholders of the firm, a firm carrying a high level of debt has an incentive to 
forgo a positive NPV project if the gain from the project accrues primarily to debtholders rather 
than the equityholders. 
By assuming that a firm simultaneously selects the level of hedging and debt before the 
selection of investment, Bessembinder (1991) shows that hedging reduces the underinvestment 
problem because hedging shifts some future states of the world from default to nondefault states 
and. Therefore, this increases the states where shareholders receive a larger proportion of the 
incremental benefits from the projects, which in turn reduces the incentives for equityholders to 
underinvest.  
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) suggest, based on Myers and Majluf (1984), that 
costly external funds provide incentives for corporate hedging. With perfect capital markets, 
internal and external financing are perfect substitutes. However, previous studies find that, other 
things being equal, the asymmetry of information about investment quality leads to a gap 
between internal and external financing costs due to information problems. Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein (1993) thus argue that since external funds are more expensive, a stable supply of 
internal cash flows reduces the underinvestment problem. Therefore, both Bessembinder (1991) 
and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) suggest that firms with more investment opportunities 
should hedge more.    5 
Empirically, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Dolde (1995), Gay and Nam (1998), 
and Graham and Rogers (2002) all find that there is a significant positive relation between R&D 
expenses, a proxy for growth opportunities, and hedging. Howton and Perfect (1998), however, 
do not find the same relationship between hedging and R&D expenses. However, using market-
to-book to proxy for investment opportunities, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002), and Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001) find no support for the underinvestment hypothesis.  
Instead of investigating whether investment opportunities provide an incentive for 
hedging, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2000) investigate whether or not hedging can smooth the 
cash flows of the firm and thus reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flows. They find 
results that support the hypothesis of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). That is, they find that 
hedging enables a firm to reduce its dependence on external funds.  
II.1.3 Financing and Investment 
As mentioned previously, Myers (1977) argues that the agency problem between 
shareholders and debtholders leads to an underinvestment problem. Since agency costs between 
shareholders and debtholders are assumed to be higher for firms with higher growth 
opportunities, firms with good investment opportunities are more likely to have less debt.  
Moreover, in the case of an adverse liquidity shock, a firm with a high degree of leverage 
is more likely to be forced to forgo its investment opportunities when external capital market 
imperfections restrict the firm’s ability to raise capital. Since leverage limits a firm’s ability to 
pursue its investment policy, a firm with good investment opportunities would, other things the 
same, like to carry less debt in order to have flexibility to grow.   6 
Empirical findings, using R&D expenses, market-to-book ratios, and capital expenditures 
to proxy for growth opportunities, generally support the negative relation between investment 
and leverage. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), and Fama and French 
(2002) find that firms with higher R&D expenses use less debt. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find 
that firms with higher market-to-book ratios carry less debt. Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) find a 
strong negative relation between leverage and capital expenditures. However, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) find an insignificant relation between leverage and investment opportunities. 
II.2 Hypothesis Development 
Figure 1 shows that the underinvestment theories predict a positive relation between 
hedging and investment opportunities, while debt capacity theories argue that hedging allows 
firms to increase their debt ratios. However, the negative effects of leverage on investment lead 
Ross (1996) to argue that if a firm hedges and increases its leverage, the effect of hedging on 
underinvestment is ambiguous. Hedging reduces the probability of underinvestment by providing 
stable cash flows on one hand but, on the other hand, higher leverage increases the probability of 
underinvestment since a higher portion of the project benefits go toward bondholders. Based on 
the arguments of Myers (1977) and Ross (1996), we thus hypothesize that managers with high 
investment opportunities are more likely to hedge to mitigate the underinvestment problem and 
are less likely to increase debt capacity by hedging.  
Which firms should hedge to increase debt capacity? Stulz (1996) argues that managers 
who try to maximize shareholders’ wealth but with few growth opportunities should hedge to 
increase debt capacity. Stulz (1996) points out that “the substitution of debt for equity leads 
managers to pay out excess capital- an action that could be a major source of value added in 
industries with overcapacity and few promising investment opportunities” (page 17).    7 
The above discussion motivates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Managers with high (low) growth opportunities are more likely to increase their 
levels of investment (leverage) by hedging and less likely to increase leverage 
(investment) by hedging.  
 
III. Model and Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we will create an interaction variable, d1 · P/E ratio. Follow 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and 
Weston (2001), we use a binary variable, d1, to indicate whether a firm hedges or not. The term 
d1 is equal to one for derivatives users, and 0 otherwise. We do not use notional amounts of 
derivatives use because Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) argue that “the annual  report 
disclosures are noisy, often because of aggregation and netting” (page 1334). Graham and 
Rogers (2002) also state that prior to the issue of SFAF 119 (which came into effect in 1994) 
“financial statement disclosures were generally inadequate to analyze the extent of derivatives 
hedging” (page 823). Our sample firms cover fiscal years from 1992 to 1996. During these years 
the notional amounts of commodity derivatives were not available and many firms in the sample 
report the use of derivatives but do not report their levels, we feel that a dummy variable is a 
more appropriate proxy than notional amounts. Finally, Smith (2002) shows that if a regressor is 
measured with error, then the estimated coefficient will be biased toward zero and there is no 
way to recover the true coefficient. However, by using the dummy variable approach, not only 
do we not encounter the above problems but we can obtain the true estimate, provided that the 
cut off rate is known, as it is in this case (i.e., zero). For our empirical tests we follow McConnell 
and Servaes (1995) and use the P/E ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities. The P/E ratio is   8 
calculated by dividing the stock price at the end of fiscal year by operating earnings before 
depreciation per share. 
We first investigate hedging, financing, and investment decisions in a fixed-effects model 
since our data represents a panel data-set. We also provide some tests using  a simultaneous 
equations framework since estimation within a system allows us to avoid false inferences of 
causality among these decisions that are due to spurious correlations.  
III.1 Financing model 
To test our hypothesis, we regress leverage on the interaction variable, d1 · P/E ratio, and 
other control variables suggested by Titman and Wessels (1988). The leverage model is specified 
as follows:  
t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
Size Tax on Depreciati
IPE enditure Capital E P d d Leverage
, , 7 , 6 , 5
, 4 , 3 , 1 2 1 1 0 ,
) ( ) ( ) (
) ( ) exp ( ) / ( ) ( ) (
e a a a
a a a a a
+ + + +
+ + · + + =
 
where leverage is measured as long-term debt plus current portion of long-term debt over total 
assets. The ratio of capital expenditure expenses to total assets is used as a proxy for investment. 
Inventory, plant & equipment (IPE), a proxy for collateral value, is measured by the ratio of 
inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. It is thought that firms with a higher level of 
IPE should be able to carry higher debt levels. Depreciation, measured by depreciation scaled by 
total assets, and the ratio of net operating loss carry forwards over total assets (Tax), are proxies 
for non-debt tax shields. Firm size is measured by the log of total assets. We expect a2 to be 
negative if f irms with high growth opportunities are less likely to hedge to increase debt 
capacity.  
III.2 Investment model 
To investigate the relationship between derivative use and investment, we follow the 
same procedure as we do in the leverage model. We regress capital expenditure expenses scaled   9 
by total assets on the interaction variable and a set of control variables suggested by Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, 1998) and Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) in order to test our three 
hypotheses. The investment model is defined as follows: 
t i t i
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All dependent and independent variables are the same as those specified in the debt model expect 
for cash flow. Cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation less the sum of 
taxes, interest expenses, common dividends, and preferred dividends scaled by total assets. Cash 
flow enters into this equation because t he literature finds that, other things being equal, 
investment is highly sensitive to internal funds.
1  We expect b2 to be positive since firms with 
good investment opportunities are more likely to hedge to alleviate underinvestment problems.  
III.3 Hedging model 
To investigate the incentives for hedging, we specify the model of hedging decisions 
following Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997).
2 The model is as follows: 
t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i
Size Accuracy
Tax ratio Quick enditure Capital Leverage h
, 6 , 5
, 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , 1
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( ) (
g g
g g g g g
+ +
+ + + + =
 
The quick ratio, a proxy for liquidity, is measured as cash and short-term investments over 
current liabilities. The more liquid firms have less need of hedging. Tax, as defined in the 
leverage equation, is a proxy for tax function convexity since Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest 
that firms facing convex tax schedules have greater incentives to hedge. A nalyst forecast 
accuracy (Accuracy) is a proxy for asymmetric information. DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995) 
argue that if managers have private information, shareholders will be better off if the firm hedges 
                                                 
1 See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Ptersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and Hubbard (1998). 
2 All the control variables are suggested by Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), but they also include other control 
variables in the model, which we ignore.     10 
since hedging can eliminate noise and thus improve the informativeness of corporate earnings as 
a signal of project quality. Therefore, firms with a high level of asymmetric information are more 
likely to hedge. Following DaDalt, Gay, and Nam (2002), we construct analyst forecast accuracy 
for earnings by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the analysts' composite 
mean earnings per share forecast made in the last I/B/E/S reporting month prior to the release of 
actual earnings and the actual earnings per share for that year. We then divide this difference by 
the absolute value of the actual earnings per share. The other control variables are the same as 
those specified previously. 
 
IV. The Data 
 We construct our sample of non-financial firms from the Swaps Monitor database, 
covering fiscal years from 1992 to 1996 (the last year of data reported). Swap Monitor reports 
derivatives usage information for all Fortune 500 and Business Week 1000 firms, all other 
industrial firms with revenues greater than $500 million or assets greater than $500 million, and 
other known derivatives users regardless of firm size.  Table  1 presents information on the 
number of interest rate, exchange rate, and/or commodity derivatives users and non-users. The 
number of users increases from 644 in 1992 to 1035 in 1996 and the number of non-users 
decreases from 1,108 in 1992 to 717 in 1996. We obtain financial data from the Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat and analysts forecasts from I/B/E/S. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for 
the explanatory variables used in this study.   11 
 
V. Empirical Results 
In this section, we use multivariate tests to examine hedging, financing, and investment 
decisions. We conduct fixed-effects models and simultaneous equations specifications for a 
sample of derivatives users and non-users as well as for a sample of new users of derivatives.    
 V.1.1 Fixed-effects estimation 
Since our data is a panel data-set, we introduce fixed-effects models to control for 
possible industry and time effects which might affect a firm’s financing, hedging, and investment 
decisions. The industry effects are measured by four-digit SIC dummy variables. 
Table 3 reports the results from fixed-effects estimation. The leverage model shows that 
hedging allows firms to increase its debt capacity. In particular, the coefficient of d1 is significant 
at 1% level. Consistent with our hypothesis, high-growth firms do not hedge to increase debt 
capacity. The coefficient of d1 · P/E is negative and significant at 1% level. With respect to the 
other explanatory variables, we find a significantly negative relation between capital expenditure 
and leverage, which is consistent with the empirical findings of most of the previous research. 
We also find a positive relationship between leverage and collateral value (IPE) as well as net 
operating loss carry forwards (Tax), which is consistent with theory.  
From the investment equation, we do not find a positive relation between hedging and 
investment, but we do find that high-growth firms hedge to increase their investment 
opportunities. The coefficient of d1 · P/E is positive and significant at the 10% level. Consistent 
with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, 1998), we also find a positive relation between cash 
flows and capital expenditure.    12 
In the derivatives use equation, we find that leverage is significantly positively related to 
derivatives use, which is consistent with the financial distress argument. We also find that firm 
size is positively correlated with the hedging decision. We do not find a significant relation 
between hedging and capital expenditure, asymmetric information measure, or tax incentive for 
hedging.  
V.2 Simultaneous equations of hedging, leverage, and investment 
Our tests, up until now, implicitly assumed the derivatives use decision is exogenous.  
However, in reality, hedging, financing, and investment decisions are more likely to be 
endogenous. Estimation within a system allows us to avoid false inferences of causality among 
these decisions that are due to least squares bias.  
Table 4 reports the results of derivatives use, leverage, and investment within a 
simultaneous equation framework. We have adjusted our estimation methodology to account for 
the fact that one of the endogenous variables is zero/one. We use a two-stage estimation method 
discussed in Maddala (1983), (pages 242-247) to provide consistent estimates of the parameters.
3 
In the first stage, separate OLS regressions are run for the leverage and capital expenditure 
decisions and probit regression for the derivatives use decision. In the second stage, structural 
equations are estimated by replacing the explanatory variables with the predicted values from the 
first-stage regressions.  
The leverage equation shows that on average, derivative use (d1) leads to a significant 
increase in the level of leverage but the level decreases as a firm’s growth opportunities increase. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that firms with high growth opportunities are less likely to 
hedge to increase debt capacity than firms with low growth opportunities.  
                                                 
3 We thank Ping Hu from the SAS institute for providing us with an estimation package. We note that this code will 
generally be available to the public in the next version of the SAS estimation packages.   13 
The capital expenditure equation indicates that hedgers have a significantly higher level 
of investment than non-hedgers and the level is enhanced by a firm’s growth opportunities. This 
result supports our hypothesis that high growth firms hedge to increase their investment 
opportunities.  
The derivative use equation shows that bigger firms and firms with a high level of capital 
expenditure and net operating loss carry forward hedge more.  But surprisingly, we find a 
negative relation between hedging and leverage. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) also find a 
negative relation between hedging and leverage and their interpretation for this result is that high 
growth firms tend to hedge more and borrow less.   
V.3 New Derivatives Users 
In this section, we further investigate the relationship between hedging, financing and 
investment for new users of derivatives. By looking at new users, we can alleviate the concern 
that non-users may not be an appropriate control group for users due to different firm 
characteristics. Following Guay (1999), a firm is defined as a new derivatives user if it reports 
derivatives use in year t, but does not report a position in derivatives in any years prior to year t 
during the sample period. Firms that report derivatives use in the year 1992 are not identified as 
new users since the data on derivatives usage for 1991 is unavailable. The initial sample contains 
828 firms that are identified as new users. 
Table 5 reports the results from fixed-effects models. Consistent with the cross sectional 
tests, we find that firms with high growth opportunities are less likely to hedge to increase debt 
capacity. The coefficient of  d1  · P/E  is significantly negative. However, in the capital 
expenditure equation, we do not find a significant relation between the interaction variable (d1 · 
P/E) and capital expenditure.    14 
Table 6 presents the results that examine the relationship of derivatives use, leverage, and 
investment for new users within a simultaneous equations framework. The results indicate a 
positive relation between capital expenditure and d1 · P/E but a marginally significant positive 
relation between leverage and d1 · P/E. Overall, our results are consistent with those of a using 




  This paper  empirically  investigates the interaction between hedging, financing, and 
investment decisions. Theoretical predictions looking at the three decisions together are different 
from earlier literature that looks at just two of the three decisions in isolation. 
  The results of the study, conducted via fixed-effects models and simultaneous equations, 
strongly support the idea that firms with plentiful growth opportunities manage risk in order to 
hedge their high growth opportunities, but they do not hedge to increase leverage. The results 
confirm Ross’ hypothesis (1996) that hedging to increase debt capacity would not mitigate the 
underinvestment problem, which is the goal that a high-growth firm would be more likely to 
pursue. However, firms with few investment opportunities increase their leverage by hedging. 
The results support Stulz’s argument (1996) that hedging to increase tax shields, resulting from 
increases in leverage, could be a major source of value added for firms with low growth 
opportunities.   15 
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Figure 1: The relation among hedging, leverage, and investment. The underinvestment 
theories predict that firms with greater investment opportunities are more likely to hedge and 
thus hedging allows firms to take on more attractive investment opportunities. The financial 
distress cost argument predicts that firms with high debt ratios are more likely to hedge and the 
debt capacity argument posits that firms are all better off hedging in order to increase leverage. 
The agency costs between shareholders and debtholders suggest a negative relation between 
investment and leverage. By considering the relation among hedging, leverage, and investment, 
Ross (1996) argues that hedging to increase leverage may not alleviate underinvestment 
problems since higher leverage increases the agency costs of debt that would lead to the 
incentives for underinvestment. Thus, firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to 
hedge to increase investment and less likely to increase leverage.  
Hedging 
Investment  Leverage 
(-) 
(-) 
(+)  (-)  (+)  (+) 
Hedging 
Investment  Leverage 
(-) 
(-) 
(+)  (+)  (+)  (+) 
Traditional predictions for any 
two of the three hedging, 
financing, and investment 
decisions 
Ross’ predictions when 
considering these three 
decisions instead of two 
out of the three.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Information of Derivatives Users and Non-Users 
This table provides descriptive statistics of non-financial firms defined as interest rate, and/or exchange 
rate,  and/or commodity  derivatives users or non-users from 1992 to 1996 as reported in the Swaps 
Monitor database.  
 








Year  Users  Non-users  Users  Non-users  Users  Non-users  Users  Non-users 
1992  434  1,145  346  1,233  91  338  644  1,108 
1993  511  1,068  402  1,177  147  282  761  991 
1994  529  1,050  491  1,088  210  219  886  866 
1995  529  1,050  414  1,165  224  205  847  905 
1996  639  940  480  1,099  264  165  1,035  717 
a. The number of users (non-users) in these columns will not equal to the sum of users (non-users) of 
interest-rate, currency, and commodity derivatives if firms that use multiple derivatives.    20 
Table 2. Explanatory variables-Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary information for the independent variables used in this study. The sample 
contains firm-year observations from the period 1992-1996. d1 is derivative dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives 
and zero otherwise. The P/E ratio is calculated by dividing the stock price at the end of fiscal year by 
operating earnings before depreciation per share.  Leverage is measured by (long-term debt + current 
portion of long-term debt)/total assets. Capital expenditure is capital expenditure expenses/total assets. 
IPE is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets.  Depreciation is depreciation 
expenses/total assets.  The q uick ratio is calculated as cash and short-term investments over current 
liabilities. Cash flow is defined as (operating income before depreciation - taxes - interest expenses - 
common dividends - preferred dividends)/total assets. Tax is net operating loss carry forwards/total 
assets. Accuracy is analyst forecast accuracy, computed as the absolute value of average analyst forecast 
errors of fiscal year end earnings per share scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings per share. Size 
is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  No. obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median  10
th percentile  90
th percentile 
d1 · P/E ratio  6,533  3.862  6.197  2.285  0.000  9.937 
Leverage  6,512  0.289  0.217  0.273  0.028  0.525 
Capital 
expenditure 
6,429  0.077  0.076  0.057  0.018  0.152 
IPE  6,436  0.523  0.221  0.534  0.210  0.815 
Depreciation  6,532  0.049  0.031  0.044  0.020  0.084 
Quick ratio  6,042  0.540  2.170  0.164  0.021  1.233 
Cash flow  6,203  0.072  0.096  0.076  0.010  0.149 
Tax  4,303  0.055  0.281  0.000  0.000  0.102 
Accuracy  5,227  0.296  1.724  0.038  0.004  0.444 
Size  6,533  6.389  1.795  6.302  4.123  8.783 
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Table 3. Fixed-effects Estimation of Derivatives Use, Financing, and Investment Decisions 
This table presents results from fixed-effects  estimation that relates financing and investment 
decisions to the use of derivatives. The sample contains firm-year observations from the period 
1992-1996. Leverage is measured by (long-term debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total 
assets. Capital expenditure is capital expenditure expenses/total assets. d1 is derivative dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of interest rate, foreign currency, 
or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. The P/E ratio is calculated by dividing the stock 
price at the end of fiscal year by operating earnings before depreciation per share. IPE is the ratio 
of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. Depreciation is depreciation expenses/total 
assets. The quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-term investments over current liabilities. 
Cash flow is defined as (operating income before depreciation  - taxes - interest expenses - 
common dividends  - preferred dividends)/total assets. Tax is  net operating loss carry 
forwards/total assets. Accuracy is analyst forecast accuracy, computed as the absolute value of 
average analyst forecast errors of fiscal year end earnings per share scaled by the absolute value 
of actual earnings per share. Size is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. P-values 
are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Leverage  Capital expenditure  d1 














Capital expenditure  -0.1118** 
(0.0524) 
  0.0979 
(0.5476) 
IPE  0.1132*** 
(0.0000) 
   
Depreciation  0.0425 
(0.7687) 
   
Quick ratio      -0.0199* 
(0.0556) 
Cash flow    0.1149*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Tax  0.0758*** 
(0.0000) 
  -0.0346 
(0.5978) 
Accuracy      -0.0053 
(0.2866) 






Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
R-square  0.5369  0.4890  0.5342 
Observations  4,178  6,083  3,267 
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Table 4. Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Hedging, Financing, and Investment Decisions  
This table presents results for examining firms’ decisions of derivatives use, leverage, and 
investment within a simultaneous equations framework.  The sample contains firm-year 
observations from the period 1992-1996.  Leverage is measured by (long-term debt + current 
portion of long-term debt)/total assets. Capital expenditure is capital expenditure expenses/total 
assets. d1 is derivative dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of 
interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. The P/E ratio is 
calculated by dividing the stock price at the end of fiscal year by operating earnings before 
depreciation per share.  IPE is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. 
Depreciation is depreciation expenses/total assets. The quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-
term investments over current liabilities.  Cash flow is defined as (operating income before 
depreciation  - taxes - interest expenses  - common dividends - preferred dividends)/total assets. 
Tax is net operating loss carry forwards/total assets. Accuracy is analyst forecast accuracy, 
computed as the absolute value of average analyst forecast errors of fiscal year end earnings per 
share scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings per share. Size is the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets. P-values are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Leverage  Capital expenditure  d1 




















Capital expenditure  -0.0586*** 
(0.0000) 
  5.4634*** 
(0.0000) 
IPE  0.3629*** 
(0.0000) 
   
Depreciation  -2.6039*** 
(0.0000) 
   
Quick ratio      -0.0964*** 
(0.0029) 
Cash flow    0.2921*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Tax  0.0413* 
(0.0711) 
  0.3874* 
(0.0869) 
Accuracy      0.0031 
(0.7891) 






       
Log likelihood  3,441.00     
Observations  3,190     
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Table 5. Fixed-effects Estimation of Derivatives Use, Financing, and Investment Decisions 
for New Users of Derivatives 
This table presents results from fixed-effects  estimation that relates financing and investment 
decisions to the use of derivatives for new users of derivatives. The sample contains firm-year 
observations from the period 1992-1996.  Leverage is measured by (long-term debt + current 
portion of long-term debt)/total assets. Capital expenditure is capital expenditure expenses/total 
assets. d1 is derivative dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use of any type of 
interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. The P/E ratio is 
calculated by dividing the stock price at the end of fiscal year by operating earnings before 
depreciation per share.  IPE is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. 
Depreciation is depreciation expenses/total assets. The quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-
term investments over current liabilities.  Cash flow is defined as (operating income before 
depreciation  - taxes - interest expenses  - common dividends - preferred dividends)/total assets. 
Tax is net operating loss carry forwards/total assets. Accuracy is analyst forecast accuracy, 
computed as the absolute value of average analyst forecast errors of fiscal year end earnings per 
share scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings per share. Size is the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets. P-values are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Leverage  Capital expenditure  d1 














Capital expenditure  -0.0453 
(0.6365) 
  0.4462* 
(0.0559) 
IPE  0.1002** 
(0.0293) 
   
Depreciation  0.0191 
(0.9421) 
   
Quick ratio      -0.0091 
(0.5001) 
Cash flow    0.1987*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Tax  0.0175 
(0.4211) 
  -0.2981** 
(0.0331) 
Accuracy      0.0144 
(0.4277) 






Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
R-square  0.6334  0.5728  0.7347 
Observations  1,711  2,581  1,241 
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Table 6. Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Hedging and Financing, and Investment 
Decisions for New Users of Derivatives 
This table presents results for examining firms’ decisions of derivatives use, leverage, and 
investment within a simultaneous equations framework for new users of derivatives. The sample 
contains firm-year observations from the period 1992-1996. Leverage is measured by (long-term 
debt + current portion of long-term debt)/total assets. Capital expenditure is capital expenditure 
expenses/total assets. d1 is derivative dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm reports the use 
of any type of interest rate, foreign currency, or commodity derivatives and zero otherwise. The 
P/E ratio is calculated by dividing the stock price at the end of fiscal year by operating earnings 
before depreciation per share. IPE is the ratio of inventory plus plant and equipment to total assets. 
Depreciation is depreciation expenses/total assets. The quick ratio is calculated as cash and short-
term investments over current liabilities.  Cash flow is defined as (operating income before 
depreciation  - taxes - interest expenses  - common dividends - preferred dividends)/total assets. 
Tax is net operating loss carry forwards/total assets. Accuracy is analyst forecast accuracy, 
computed as the absolute value of average analyst forecast errors of fiscal year end earnings per 
share scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings per share. Size is the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets. P-values are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Leverage  Capital expenditure  d1 




















Capital expenditure  -3.9713*** 
(0.0000) 
  3.9183*** 
(0.0000) 
IPE  0.8366*** 
(0.0000) 
   
Depreciation  3.2048*** 
(0.0000) 
   
Quick ratio      -0.0322 
(0.4019) 
Cash flow    0.2294*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Tax  0.2897*** 
(0.0000) 
  0.1878 
(0.5893) 
Accuracy      -0.0408 
(0.3907) 






       
Log likelihood  893.53     
Observations  1,203     
  